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Abstract
Proponents of EVA and related \shareholder value" measures intend to replace earnings and to
supplement stock returns by including their own measures in managerial compensation schemes.
Stern Stewart's EVA appears to be the most widely recognized measure. However, there are not
very many rms have explicitly adopted such schemes. One obvious reason, which we account for
explicitly, is that they are not appropriate for all rms. An additional, less obvious fact, is that
rms can directly or even indirectly mimic EVA measures. Firms such as Clorox and O.M. Scott
use their own performance measures, which are arguably variants of EVA.
In this paper, we use publicly available estimates of rm level EVA and examine whether rms
pay according to it regardless of their explicit policies. This research approach captures the fact
mentioned above, that rms can do home-made EVA performance evaluation.. We adapt the
technique of Garvey and Milbourn (2000) to model the optimal weight placed on EVA at the rm
level. There is enormous cross-sectional heterogeneity in the estimated \value-added" of EVA for
various rms. With our estimates of optimal weights, we verify empirically that compensation paid
to the top ve executives in over 2,000 rms is highly consistent with our optimal compensation
arrangements.1 Introduction
With the emergence of the \shareholder value maximization" mantra held dear by nearly every
publicly-traded corporation, many consultancy practices come forward with various proprietary
measures of economic performance. These measures are touted for their role in implementing
more ecient compensation schemes. Arguably, Stern Stewart is the most prominent player in
this domain with their EVA
R 
, shorthand for Economic Value Added.1 EVA is a periodic measure
calculated as after-tax operating prots less a charge for capital employed, where the charge is
based on the cost of capital (or WACC) times the level of capital employed.
The underlying premise of EVA is that if managers focus their eorts on maximizing earnings,
subsequent earnings growth may come at the expense of the balance sheet. That is, managers
may overinvest in costly capital if they are only concerned with the prot and loss statement. To
counter such asset ineciencies, Stern Stewart (see Ehbar (1998)) argues that rms should replace
earnings as the objective in their managerial compensation schemes with EVA.
While EVA is intuitively appealing, and is certainly consistent with basic project appraisal
techniques taught in any corporate nance course (such as NPV analysis), it has not formally been
adopted by many rms. Recent studies by Wallace (1997), Hogan and Lewis (1999) and Kleinman
(1999) uncover roughly 70 US rms that have formally adopted EVA (or a close substitute, such
as Residual Income or Economic Prot). An immediate question is why have so few rms have
embraced EVA?
One obvious reason for the relative scarcity in EVA adoptions is that EVA might not be right for
every rm. For instance, calculating teh components of EVA within a rm is never straightforward,
and these diculties may vary in the cross-section of rms. Consider a multi-product company
that wants to calculate EVA for each of its product. If some assets are shared (such as an assembly
line), allocating a usage charge by product may be dicult for either lack of relevant data or because
it is too politically costly in that it creates inecient \turf battles". Thus, it is possible that costs
of implementing EVA eectively outweigh the benets.
An additional reason that many rms forgo implementing an EVA compensation plan is that
it may simply be an ineective measure of a manager's actions for some rms. Alternatively, its
information content may just be unknown. In a companion paper (Garvey and Milbourn (2000)),
we confront this possibility directly by acknowledging that ap r i o r i , the \signal" content of EVA
1For the other players and their respective measures, see Myers (1997).
1and earnings, respectively, in terms of a manager's marginal contribution may be unknown to senior
management and is denitely unknown to researchers. We develop a formal empirical method that
uses correlations between these two measures and the rm's stock price to ascertain the signal
content of each measure. This allows us to empirically derive the optimal compensation weights
that EVA should receive relative to earnings. Interestingly, in more than half of the cases (out
of 2,096 observations), EVA provides no additional information vis-a-vis earnings and hence, it
receives zero weight in the optimal compensation scheme.2
If rms for which we assign no value to EVA share our assessment, it seems reasonable that
they have not adopted EVA formally. On the other hand, out of the 590 rm-years, we identify
273 that should nd value in adopting EVA. With only the handful of rms that had formally
adopted EVA (less than 70), our empirical approach in the companion paper in fact had reasonable
success in predicting these EVA adoptions as a function of our assessment of EVA's value to these
rms.
However, what about the other rms from this large subsample of rms for which EVA is
estimated to be of value? Why have they not formally adopted EVA? In this paper, we take an
alternative approach in explaining these non-adopters. Might their compensation schemes pay as
if they had adopted EVA? That is, do these rms use a homemade version of EVA? There are
certainly examples of such rms. Clorox computes its own measure that closely resembles EVA (see
Davis (1996)), and OM Scott imposes a charge against earnings for working capital employed (see
Baker and Wruck (1994)). Many other rms use basic capital budgeting principles in performance
evaluation and since EVA is consistent with such principle, these rms may also pay according to
EVA at least implicitly.
We begin the paper by developing the basic principles of the theory and empirical method pro-
vided by Garvey and Milbourn (2000). We model a rm seeking to design an optimal compensation
contract when the manager makes two eort choices. While managerial actions are not directly
observable, several performance measures are. There are two performance measures, shorthand for
EVA and earnings, which provide a noisy estimate of the manager's choice on one of these actions.
Introducing noise in performance measures is standard in such models, however, we also allow for
the realistic possibility that the two dierent measures dier in their signal content. That is, while
they both contain noise, they may also miss some portion of the manager's eort, and this \signal
2The only constraint we put on the compensation scheme is linearity. We defer to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
for the relative generality of this approach.
2content" may vary across the two measures.
A third performance measure, which is an estimate of the second managerial action, is observed
by capital market participants but is not contractible. This measure, along with the two measures
described above, are used in setting the rm's stock price in equilibrium. What our empirical
method does is to use the relationship between the EVA and earnings performance measures,
respectively, and the rm's stock price as a way to learn about the unknown signal content of each.
This allows us to derive the weights that should be placed on EVA relative earnings in an optimal
compensation arrangement. We then take this empirical method to the data.
Estimates of rm level earnings and EVA is collected for the time period 1978-1997. These data
are then merged with the Compustat ExecuComp database, which provides detailed compensation
data for the top ve executives named in the proxy statements. We rst estimate the optimal
relative weights that should be placed on EVA and earnings in the compensation contract. As
stated earlier, many of the rms should optimally put zero weight on EVA. In order to compare our
results to others in the compensation literature, we also calculate the relative weights that would
be placed on EVA and earnings by simply comparing the ratio of variances of these two measures.
This approach has been used in Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Yermack (1995). Our estimates
of the optimal weights show a correlation of 0.202 or less with the ratio of variances. Importantly,
all of our results are qualitatively unaected by using either a 1978-1997 or 1986-1997 time period.
With the compensation data in hand, we then seek to explain the total compensation paid
to rm executives. We proceed rst with some simple regressions. For the rms that our
theory predicts should not use EVA, earnings are signicantly related to total compensation, while
EVA is insignicant. On the other hand, rms for which we show EVA has value, earnings are
insignicant in explaining total compensation, while EVA is positively related to total compensation
and statistically signicant. As a means of comparison, the simple ratio of variances is insignicant
in both subsamples.
In a more rened test of the model, we allow the coecients on EVA and Earnings to vary
continuously by incorporating interaction terms between our estimates of the optimal weights and
each of these measures. Consistent with the results above, both earnings and EVA are signicant
in explaining total compensation is consistent with the theory. Again, the simple ratio of variances
performs badly.
In summary, our paper has documented that rms do appear to pay their executives in a
manner consistent with optimal compensation. Moreover, while few rms have formally adopted
3EVA, many of them pay as if they have adopted it. We nd this encouraging given the large
proportion of rms for which EVA appears to add value to a compensation arrangement written
solely on earnings. As can be seen in the regression results, we still have a lot to learn about how
compensation contracts are written at rms given that most of our explanatory power comes from
including lagged compensation into the regression analysis. Future research will inevitably bring
us a better understanding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and characterizes
the problem we explore. Section 3 provides our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model Setup
In this section, we develop a model of managerial compensation design. Our goal is to determine
the weight that a new performance measure such as EVA should receive, when a company already
has access to accounting earnings and to stock prices. As is standard, we require all measures to be
used optimally. Less standard is our ability to express the results in terms of observable quantities.
We model an unlevered rm with risk-neutral shareholders, run by a risk-averse manager.
Fundamental rm value is determined by both the manager's eort choices random elements beyond
the manager's control. We assume that there are two dimensions of managerial eort, denoted ac
and af. The action ac can be captured by EVA and by earnings, while the action af is not revealed
by such backward-looking, accounting-based measures. This action will be captured by another
performance measure, which is then revealed through stock prices. We introduce these two types
of eort in order to distinguish between two uses of the stock price. First, it represents a direct
measure of af, and second, it can provide additional information about the competing accounting
measures of ac. The rm's terminal value is given by
Xc + Xf =( ac + c)+( af + f),
where ai 2 [0;1), for i 2f c;fg, are the manager's (unobservable) eort choices across ac and af,
and i is noise, with i s N(0;2
i )f o ri 2f c;fg. The terms c and f are independent shocks to the
manager's eorts, with variances 2
c and 2
f, respectively and means normalized to zero. Observe
that we have set the marginal and average productivity of the manager's two action choices both
equal to one. This is just a normalization as we will allow the cost of the dierent types of eort,
and therefore their value marginal products, to vary arbitrarily.
4The manager has utility that is separable in wealth and eort, and has a reservation utility level
normalized to zero. We assume that the manager has negative exponential utility over wealth, with
a coecient of risk-aversion given by r. Further, the general cost of eort is given by C(ac;a f).
Risk neutral shareholders design the manager's compensation contract to maximize their wealth,
subject to the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Given the unobservability
of both eort decisions, shareholders must rely on performance-based compensation arrangements.
Hampering these eorts in our model is the assumption that the underlying value of the rm
(Xc+Xf)i snot directly observable. Rather, there exists a set of observable performance measures
which oer noisy, yet informative estimates of the individual components of rm value.
2.1 Available Performance Measures and the Stock Price
We assume that there are two competing (accounting) measures of Xc, Y1 and Y2,a n do n em e a s u r e
of Xf given by Yf. The two accounting performance measures are observable and veriable and
are given by
Y1 = 1Xc + "1
Y2 = 2Xc + "2;
where "1  N(0;!2
1)a n d"2  N(0;!2
2). For generality, we allow these errors to have a (possibly)
non-zero covariance given by Cov("1;" 2)="1"2!1!2.
The parameters 1 and 2 are positive, deterministic scalars that represent the proportion of
the manager's contribution to rm value through ac is successfully captured by the performance
measure. The motivation for this specication is as follows. It is apparent that in the performance
specication of Yj = jXc +"j, \false" value creation is potentially registered in either measure by
the error term "j. Naturally, these errors could dier across performance measures. Similarly, the
potentially nonequal j's capture the fact that our performance measures might also fail to register
value-increases that have in fact occurred. That is, these measures can, and most likely do, have
dierential \signal content" as well. Thus, we model a situation where performance measures are
freely available for contracting purposes, yet their value in this regard may be uncertain.
The above formulation is in part an attempt to capture the implicit logic behind the \R2
debate". If all practitioners agreed on the properties of alternative performance measures, there
would be no reason to argue about which is most closely related to stock prices. One would simply
demonstrate that EVA (or a related "shareholder value" measure) is consistent with basic valuation
5principles while accounting earnings are not. However, actual performance measurement involves
both noise and judgement. As Stern Stewart and other practitioners have implicitly recognized, the
theoretical argument in favor of EVA or related measures needs buttressing by empirical evidence,
such as the relationship between the performance measure and stock prices. Our model indicates
exactly what kind of evidence is needed and how it should be used.
For the case of earnings, it is well-known that earnings changes have a substantially lower
variance than do stock returns, even after removing market eects from the stock returns. But if
earnings had a  value of one, then they would be more volatile than stock returns due to the noise
term ". While this can be explained away by assuming that this eect stems solely from variations
in future value (Yf) or simple stock price noise, it is equally likely that earnings reports suppress
information, as well as noise. A similar argument can be made for EVA. First, changes in EVA are
far less volatile than abnormal stock returns in Biddle et al's (1997) sample, as well as in our sample.
Second, EVA's adjustments to reported earnings are unlikely to undo all of the conservativeness
in accounting earnings. Finally, and perhaps most important, the equity cost of capital used in
Stern Stewart's capital charge is estimated with a great deal of noise.3 In response, Stern Stewart
appear to advocate smoothing the capital charge across rms and over time, as evidenced by the
following excerpt:
Coca-Cola, (a prominent Stern Stewart client), uses 12% as its single cost of capital
worldwide, expressed in dollars. Why 12%? Because it's 1% a month.4
Our formulation resembles that used by Sloan (1993) in allowing accounting numbers to be
related to fundamental value by a multiplicative constant. However, his approach critically relied
on the extreme assumption that abnormal stock returns are a noiseless measure of Xc.T h e
unfortunate implication is that accounting variables should not be used at all in an optimal contract.
We allow for a more realistic setting in which all measures are noisy and, in which we don't know
all of the relevant attributes of the available performance measures of ac.
In addition to the two current value performance measures, there is a measure of af given by
Yf = Xf + "f;
where "f  N(0;!2
f). We assume that Yf is observed by capital market investors and hence, re-
vealed through the stock price. In equilibrium, the stock price (P) is set by competitive, risk-neutral
traders who observe Y1, Y2 and Yf, and understand the statistical properties of each measure.
3See Fama and French (1997) for an examination of the time-variation in industry costs of capital.
4See Ehbar (1999).
6The measure Yf could very well represent information that is privately observed by some capital
market investors. However, it should be noted that our analysis could readily accommodate
the assumption that the rm's shareholders (who design the manager's wage contract) could also
observe Yf. In fact, they could also observe the 1 and 2 parameters. What is implicit in our
analysis is that the shareholders design a contract using the two accounting measures and stock
price, and treat Yf as noncontractible. Our contribution builds on the reality that as empirical
researches, we cannot observe 1, 2,o rYf.
Given this information structure, the stock price is
P = E(Xc + Xf j Y1;Y 2;Y f)+,
where   N(0;2
) captures the possibility that market prices have additional errors that are
independent of fundamentals.5 Note that since expected returns are zero, any non-zero returns
are abnormal returns reﬂecting innovations in the measures Y1, Y2, Yf or the error term :
2.2 Optimal Contracts
For incentive contracting purposes, the rm's shareholders are interested in the manager's contri-
butions to rm value through ac and af.I f 1 and 2 were known, the stock price would be used
only to infer the manager's long-term eort af. The reason is that the stock price's estimate of ac
is based only on measures Y1 and Y2, which can already be used directly for contracting purposes.
In this case, the stock price is only a useful surrogate for the manager's choice of af.I n t h i s c a s e ,





for i 2f 1;2g. Restricting the set of feasible wage contracts to be linear, we can then write an
optimal contract directly on the transformed performance measures by solving for
w(Y1;Y 2;P f)=W + w1Ψ1 + w2Ψ2 + [P − E[PjY1;Y 2]],
where W represents the xed wage. The term P − E[PjY1;Y 2]is the "ltered price" of Kim and
Suh(1993) and captures the unique information in stock prices which in our model reﬂects the
noncontractible variable Yf. 6
5For simplicity, we are ignoring the fact that the manager's pay comes out of the stock price. Inclusion of this
does not qualitatively alter the results, although the algebra becomes increasingly tedious.
6We will only consider linear compensation contracts. See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) for justication of this
approach.
7Naturally, the absolute weights in this wage contract depend on the manager's cost of eort
function and on his risk-aversion coecient. However, as we know from Banker and Datar (1989)
for the case where the manager has a single eort decision (here ac), the optimal relative weights
on the two accounting measures Y1 and Y2 are independent of these considerations. Their result
carries over to our multi-task setting since we assume that both Y1 and Y2 are noisy measures of
the same action on the part of the manager.7 The essence of the Banker-Datar result is that
the weights on the two accounting measures are chosen to minimize the variance of providing the
manager with a given level of eort incentive. Since both Ψ1 and Ψ2 have unit sensitivity to eort
ac, it is optimal to place a weight bon the new measure in order to minimize Va r(dΨ1+(1−d)Ψ2).
It follows directly from the denition of the variance of such a sum that it is minimized by choosing:
d =
Va r(Ψ2) − Cov(Ψ1;Ψ2)
Va r(Ψ2)+Va r(Ψ1) − 2Cov(Ψ1;Ψ2)
.( 1 )
2.3 The Use of Shareholder Value Measures when is Unobservable
The expression for d is intuitive but is not directly testable, because we do not observe the
additional information 1 and 2 necessary to construct the measures Ψ1 and Ψ2 in the rst place.
In this section, we develop our formal framework for using stock market information to elicit
estimates of each performance measure's signal content, and then characterize the optimal weight
to be placed on each measure in terms of observables.
We make the standard assumption that market participants know the parameters of the rm's
contracting problem, including the i, and so can infer equilibrium eort decisions and expected
rm value. Clearly, the  values are critical information for traders both to compute expected
terminal values and also to update these expecations based on the realizations of the Y signals.
Since all random variables are normally distributed, we can write the price as a linear regression of
terminal rm value on the available signals:
P = E(Xc + Xf j Y1;Y 2;Y f)+ = K + b1(Y1 − E(Y1)) + b2(Y2 − E(Y2)) + bf(Yf − E(Yf)) + 
where K is a constant incorporating expected eort decisions and E(Yi)=iE(ac), for i =1 ;2.
In an ideal world, the direct way to estimate the values of 1 or 2 would be to regress Y1 or Y2
on the price in order to reveal each measure's sensitivity to fundamental value. Unfortunately,
7See Feltham and Xie (1994) for a characterization of the more general case where measures capture multiple
aspects of eort.
8matters are not as simple as that becuase the price does not directly reveal the fundamental Xc.
This section shows how to extract the necessary information from the stock price.
The rst problem is that the signals Y1 and Y2 are correlated, because they share the com-
mon "fundamental" component Xc and also because their "noise" components "1 and "2 may be
correlated. Minimizing the sum of squared errors (Xc + Xf − P)2 and solving for the regression
coecients of interest yields:
b1 =
Cov(Y1;X)Va r(Y2) − Cov(Y1;Y 2)Cov(Y2;X)






Va r(Y1)Va r(Y2) − (Cov(Y1;Y 2))
2
b2 =
Cov(Y2;X)Va r(Y1) − Cov(Y1;Y 2)Cov(Y1;X)






Va r(Y1)Va r(Y2) − (Cov(Y1;Y 2))
2





is our "raw" estimate of i. Given our expression for P and the fact that Yf and  are both
orthogonal to Y1 and Y2, we can write
Cov(Y1;P)=b1Va r(Y1)+b2Cov(Y1;Y 2)
Using our expressions for b1 and b2 we can express the two terms on the right-hand side as:
b1Va r(Y1)=
Va r(Y1)[Cov(Y1;X)Va r(Y2) − Cov(Y1;Y 2)Cov(Y2;X)]
Va r(Y1)Va r(Y2) − (Cov(Y1;Y 2))
2
b2Cov(Y1;Y 2)=
Cov(Y1;Y 2)[Cov(Y2;X)Va r (Y1) − Cov(Y1;Y 2)Cov(Y1;X)]
Va r(Y1)Va r(Y2) − (Cov(Y1;Y 2))
2
Noting that the second term in b1Va r(Y1) and the rst term in b2Cov(Y1;Y 2) sum to zero and





Va r(Y1)Va r(Y2) − [Cov(Y1;Y 2)]2













While the non-zero covariance between the accounting measures Yi no longer appears, i still
understates the true i because Va r(P) > 2
c. This is apparent given that the stock price depends
not just on Xc (as captured by Y1 and Y2), but also on Xf (revealed through Yf) and additional
noise, given by the variance of . Sloan (1993) undertook an analysis similar to that above but
assumed that the variance of abnormal stock returns were in fact equal to 2
c (which is the variance
of Xc). Under that strict assumption,  oered an unbiased estimate of . As pointed out by
Lambert (1993), this assumption is unrealistic and in fact undercuts the entire exercise since it
immediately implies that the abnormal return should be the only performance measure used.
Naturally, since we don't observe i, our estimate of i =
Cov(Yi;P)
Va r (P) r e m a i n sl e s st h a ni d e a l .
Moreover, we should state clearly that we do not claim to solve the above errors-in-variables problem
and obtain unbiased estimates of the i. When the errors ("1;" 2) in our accounting performance
measures are correlated ("1"2 6= 0), we are unable to completely decompose the variance of the
stock price into the components that reﬂect ac, af, and noise. Fortunately, as we now show, we
do not need to solve the errors-in-variables problem to obtain an unbiased measure of the relative
optimal weights on our accounting performance measures. The reason is simply that the degree of






which oers us an estimate of i, denoted b i,
b i = gi,( 4 )
for i 2f 1;2g, that carries the same constant g in both b 1 and b 2. This allows us to express the
optimal Banker and Datar (1989) relative weights (given by (??)) completely in terms of observable
magnitudes. We start with the expression
d =
Va r(Ψ2) − Cov(Ψ1;Ψ2)
Va r(Ψ2)+Va r(Ψ1) − 2Cov(Ψ1;Ψ2)



























where  denotes the simple correlation coecient. Substituting these expressions into our expression























While the above expression is entirely in terms of observables, it is not yet directly testable.
The weight b can be estimated from data, but it applies to the unobserved measures Ψ1 and Ψ2.
To solve for the optimal weights on the observed measures Y1 and Y2, we begin by noting that the



















We also now know that
d
1 − d =
Y1P (Y1P − Y1Y2Y2P)
Y2P (Y2P − Y1Y2Y1P)
(7)









and the optimal contract uses weights γY1 +( 1− γ)Y2 where:
γ =
SD(Y2)(Y1P − Y1Y2Y2P)
SD(Y2)(Y1P − Y1Y2Y2P + SD(Y1)(Y2P − Y1Y2Y1P)
2.4 Testable Implications
The results are now stated entirely in terms of observables. The optimal weight γ can be com-
puted from the variance-covariance matrix of innovations in earnings, EVA, and stock values.
These weights can then be compared to those obtained by regressing compensation on these same
measures. It is important to recognize that the theory only restricts the relative sensitivity of com-
pensation to EVA and to earnings. Without information on the manager's risk-aversion and the
11marginal value product of ac versus af, the model is silent on either the absolute weight placed on
accounting measures, or the weight of earnings relative to stock returns. To gauge the importance
of dierential value-relevance, we also use a crude measure of γ
naive = SD(Y2)=[SD(Y1)+SD(Y2)].
This corresponds to the common practice of empirical researchers of using only the raw volatility
of the competing performance measures (e.g.., Yermack, 1995; Garen, 1994)
3 Empirical Tests
3.1 Raw data and derived measures
To compute the optimal weights, we use data from the years 1986-97. Our longest possible time-
period starts in 1978 and our results are similar with this longer time-series. We use the shorter
series to reduce the chance of an underlying structural break, and to match more closely to the
compensation data which only begin in 1992. To derive our prior expectations for the weight
placed on alternative performance measures, we use standard accounting and stock price data
from Standard and Poors' Compustat and CRSP. These data are augmented with estimates of
Economic Value Added secured from the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. It is worth noting at
t h i sp o i n tt h a tw eu s et h epublicly reported EVA numbers from Stern Stewart to capture the value
of shareholder value measures.
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics of our sample. Abnormal stock returns are esti-
mated assuming a beta of one and using the NYSE value-weighted index as the market portfolio as
in Biddle et al (1997). Results are essentially identical using rm-specic betas from CRSP. We
have 6251 observations to compute the optimal weights, representing the universe of rms which
appear in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000 list as well as CRSP and COMPUSTAT for at least
six years of our sample period. We use six years to produce at least ve years per rm of unantic-
ipated changes in both stock values and accounting performance measures to compute our optimal
weights. Unanticipated changes are computed using the residuals from an AR1 regression, scaled
by lagged market value of equity as in Biddle et al (1997).
As is common with panel data on large companies, the rst seven rows of Table 1 indicate some
large outliers in accounting performance measures and stock returns as well as size. To reduce the
eects of such extreme observations, we rst removed all rms with less than ve years of data.8
We then winsorize all our values at the 1% tails before performing our statistical analyses. That
8Our results are similar if we increase the required number of years to ten, or reduce them to four.
12is, if an observation falls outside the 1% condence interval at either tail, we set it equal to the
upper or lower bound of that interval.
The next six rows of Table 1 summarize our optimal weights and the data which underlie
them. To compute the correlations that underlie our calculation of the value-added by EVA, we
use abnormal stock returns and innovations in EVA and earnings. We follow Biddle et al (1997)
in dividing our accounting measures by lagged market value of equity as this provides consistent
scaling with stock returns. Finally, we use an AR1 specication to identify innovations in the
accounting numbers, similar to Biddle et al (1997). As expected, our results are similar but noisier
if we use simple rst dierences to proxy for unexpected changes in earnings or EVA.
Standard contract theory requires that performance measures be tailored to each rm's specic
circumstances. Thus, the weight γ is computed using rm-specic statistical correlations. With
at most 12 years of data on each rm, we will inevitably have noisy measures of the relevant
correlations and variances. We can extend the series to 19 years for a subsample of rms, but
this heightens the prospect of an underlying structural break. Our results are similar with our full
sample.
As in Biddle et al (1997) and Garvey and Milbourn (2000), earnings innovations tend to be
more highly correlated with returns than are innovations in EVA. Also, the two measures tend to
be highly correlated with one another, but this source of multicollinearity is explicitly accounted for
in the theory. Both accounting measures have approximately the same amount volatility and are
in turn approximately ve times less volatile than either raw or abnormal stock returns.. The next
row of Table 1 summarizes our rm-specic estimates of the optimal weight placed on EVA relative
to earnings, γ, using data from 1986-97. To compute these numbers we follow the theory exactly
except for the following cases. If EVA innovations are negatively related to abnormal returns, this
implies that EVA is actually negative and we set its optimal weight at zero. There are 186 such
cases. If on the other hand earnings innovations are negatively and EVA innovations are positively
related to abnormal returns, we set the weight on EVA at one. There are 36 such cases. Even when
both measures are positively related to abnormal returns, it is possible for the optimal weight on
EVA to be below zero or greater than one if the two are suciently highly correlated. For example
if EVA is highly positively related to earnings but has little correlation with stock returns, then
according to optimal compensation theory EVA should be eectively used as an index and receive
a negative weight. While strictly consistent with the theory, we do not permit either measure
to receive negative weight because both are intended to be measures of performance rather than
13indices.9 The result is that just over half of our optimal weights on EVA are zero, and the upper
quartile begins at just over 44% weight on EVA. Consistent with the pattern of rms that have
explicitly adopted EVA examined in Garvey and Milbourn (2000), EVA is highly valuable in many
but not by any means in all cases. 11% of our sample are predicted by the theory to place a weight
of one on EVA and a weight of zero on earnings.
The last three rows of Table 1 summarize our compensation measures from Standard and Poors
ExecuComp. Both Salary and Bonus average around 3/5 of a million dollars and bonuses are far
more variable than salary. Total compensation is computed by Execu-Comp using the Black-
Scholes value of options granted plus any grants of stock. Consistent with the growing importance
of stock options in executive compensation documented by Hall and Liebman (1998), salary plus
bonus represents just over a third of total compensation, and accounts for less than one-sixth of the
variability in total compensation. We therefore focus on total compensation as our primary measure
of incentives. In using the value of such compensation as a measure of managers' rewards, we do
not account for the fact that options and shares continue to be sensitive to stock price performance
in years after the grant date (until the manager sells the security). This is appropriate as our focus
is on how rms make use of the unique information conveyed by earnings and shareholder value
measures exemplied by EVA. For example, an option granted in 1993 will contain some sensitivity
to earnings in 1994, but only insofar as earnings are correlated with stock returns.
3.2 Simple Correlations
Table 2.1 gives a preliminary indication of how pay is related to our alternative performance
measures. We use simple rst dierences of EVA and earnings, scaled by lagged market value of
equity as our accounting performance measures, and percent changes in pay and compensation for
our incentive rewards. Consistent with past studies, we nd that cash compensation is more strongly
related to accounting performance measures than is total compensation. In essence, accounting
performance measured as either EVA or earnings are a stronger determinant of salary and bonus
payouts than they are of option and stock grants. Such grants are more strongly related to past
stock performance, and overall they are harder to predict than salary and bonus payments. One
reason may simply be measurement error in valuing options with Black-Scholes (see, e.g. Huddart
9For example, it is dicult to imagine EVA being marketed as an index. The "story" would have to be that high
earnings are the primary indication of good performance, but if the manager also had a high value of EVA this would
indicate that he just "got lucky" and should receive less of a reward!
14(1994)). Despite this, we focus on total compensation because incentives should not be determined
by any single component of compensation.
Table 2.2 provides background evidence on our optimal weights. It is reassuring to see that
they are relatively stable over time in that there is a high correlation between weights using shorter
(1986-97) and longer (1978-97) windows. In part, this is simply because we only have more than
12 years of data available for a subsample of our rms. The last rows and columns of Table
2.1 establish that our weights are not simply picking up size, leverage, or market-to-book eects.
Industry eects may be present in our weights but we have not explored this systematically except
by allowing the errors in the regressions which follow to be correlated within but not across 3-digit
SIC code industries. Our theory is valuable even if industry eects are present because we can
say which industries should rely relatively more on EVA. This represents a signicant advance on
simply documenting the presence of industry eects without any compelling a priori theory.
3.3 Regression Results
Table 3 presents some simple and illuminating tests of the theory, exploiting the fact that we
estimate an optimal weight of zero on EVA (γ = 0) for approximately half the rms in our sample.
In all our regressions, the dependent variable is the log of total compensation. To isolate unexpected
payments, we use the log of the previous year's total compensation as an explanatory variable. This
is similar to using rst dierences except that we do not restrict expected compensation to equal
last year's compensation (which would involve setting the coecient on lag ln(total compensation)
to -1). As observed by Anderson et al (1999), the coecient turns out to be signicantly dierent
from negative one.
The rst column restricts all rms to make the same use of EVA relative to earnings. Consistent
with past research, we nd that stock returns are positively related to total compensation. Our
results are virtually identical if we use abnormal returns and we use raw returns to be consistent
with the literature such as Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Aggrawal and Samwick (1999). In the
full-sample, both earnings and EVA innovations have insignicant positive coecients. In part,
this is because the two are signicantly correlated. For example, earnings are signicant at the 5%
level if we exclude EVA. As the next two columns demonstrate, however, another reason is that we
have restricted the coecients to be equal across rms.
The second column of results in Table 3 uses only those rms for which the theory says all
weight should be placed on earnings. Consistent with the theory, earnings now have a positive and
15eect on compensation which is signicant at the 1% level, while EVA reverses sign and remains
insignicant. The last column of results restricts attention to those rms which in theory should use
EVA. Earnings are no longer signicant for this subsample while EVA has an eect that is positive
at the 10% condence level. Unfortunately, the large standard errors on the coecient of EVA in
the γ = 0 subsample and on earnings in the γ > 0 subsample mean that the estimated coecients
for EVA or earnings are not signicantly dierent from one another across subsamples. Nonetheless,
our theoretically optimal measures perform much better than the alternatives. For example, if we
split the sample according to the median of the naive variance weights, the coecients change in
the wrong direction (EVA is less important and earnings are more important when γVa r is greater
than its median) although none of these are signicant.
Table 4 presents a more rened test of the theory by allowing the coecients on EVA and
earnings to vary continuously. To do this we interact earnings and EVA innovations with our
theoretically optimal weights for the two measures. Analogous to the work Janakiriman et al
(1992) on the relative performance evaluation hypothesis, we can distinguish a weak and a strong-
form our theoretical expectations. A weak-form implication of the theory is that the interaction
term should be positive in the case of EVA and negative in the case of earnings. The strong-form
implication is that the interaction term on EVA should have a coecient of one and that on earnings
should have a coecient of negative one.
The rst column of results uses both interaction terms but excludes stock returns as an ex-
planatory variable. This specication is incomplete because stock returns are expected to aect
compensation. However, the estimated coecients on EVA and on earnings from this regression
correspond to the theoretical model because the model uses the ltered price, i.e., that part of the
price that is orthogonal to our accounting measures. It is clear from a comparison of R2 with the
previous set of regressions that most of the explanatory power comes from the lagged eect of total
compensation rather than any performance measure. This simply reminds us that we still have
much to learn about the determinants of pay, especially the granting of options (see, e.g., Yermack,
1995). Nonetheless, our theory receives support in all its implications for this regression. We can
reject the hypothesis that either interaction term has a zero coecient at the 1% level, and cannot
reject the hypothesis that EVA interaction has a coecient of one and that the earnings interaction
has a coecient of -1.
The next column shows that the results are similar but somewhat noisier if we include stock
returns as an explanatory variable. This is to be expected because stock returns are not orthog-
16onal to accounting measures. We can still reject the hypothesis that the coecient on the EVA
interaction is zero at the 10% level, but are unable to so reject the hypothesis of no eect for the
earnings interaction. The point estimates are, however, still qualitatively close to and statistically
indistinguishable from those predicted by the theory (1 for the EVA interaction and -1 for the
earnings interaction).
The last two columns in Table 4 provide some perspective on the results we have achieved.
Here we use the naive variance weights γVa rin place of the theoretically optimal weights γ.T h e s e
weights have no ability to identify rms where EVA is relatively more important than earnings.
It is also noteworthy, analogous to Aggrawal and Samwick's (1999) ndings on the use of stock
returns that earnings innovations have a statistically signicant eect on compensation only when
we use our optimal weights to allow the eect to dier across rms.
Table 5 is included for completeness and comparability to some of the past literature. Here
we restrict attention to cash compensation and achieve far weaker results for the theory. This is
to be expected in that while our estimates of the value of stock options in total compensation are
undoubtedly noisy, they provide a better measure of incentives than does ignoring such compen-
sation altogether. In this section, we develop a model of managerial compensation design. Our
goal is to determine the marginal value of adding the EVA performance measure to an existing
earnings-based compensation plan.10 As is standard, we require all measures to be used optimally.
Less standard is our ability to express the results in terms of observable quantities.
4 Concluding Remarks
Not surprisingly, given the prominence of shareholder value principles at public corporations, enor-
mous practitioner interest in helping rms in this objective has emerged. However, the full value
of EVA and related \shareholder value-based" performance measures remains to be learned. To
date in fact, only a handful of rms have formally adopted and begun paying their executives based
on such economically appealing measures. In this paper, we have sought to examine whether a
much greater proportion of rms had actually begun paying as if they were using measures such as
EVA. With a formal method in hand for identifying such rms, we found strong empirical evidence
that rms did pay according to optimal compensation schemes that weighted EVA and earnings
10It is important to note that our analysis is directly amenable to any pair-wise comparison of performance measures.
We focus on only two accounting measures since we are interested in characterizing the battle over which accounting
measure { EVA or earnings { is better for incentive compensation.
17according to their marginal values in reﬂecting managerial actions.
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20Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max
MV of Equity 6,251 7,806 3,143 15,211 120 339,539
Book Assets 6,251 11,646 3,229 21,762 147 304,142
Long-Term Debt 6,251 1,755 514 4,578 0 80,923
Earnings 6,251 385.7 156.0 829.2 -7,987 8,203
EVA 6,251 -37.42 0.783 534.8 -6,604 4,821
Raw Returns 6,251 0.239 0.184 0.364 -0.703 5.44
Abnormal Returns 6,251 0.177 0.266 0.255 -0.986 1.04
Corr(uearn, ab. Ret.) 549 0.336 0.400 0.355 -0.927 0.982
Corr (ueva, ab. Ret.) 549 0.123 0.125 0.354 -0.863 0.861
Corr (uearn, ueva) 549 0.403 0.495 0.432 -0.896 0.991
SD (uearn) 549 0.0405 0.0307 0.300 0.0051 0.225
SD (ueva) 549 0.0470 0.0348 0.391 0.0041 0.256
γ (optimal weight ueva) 549 0.241 0.0 0.355 0.0 1.0
Salary 2,996 0.707 0.660 0.326 0 3.649
Bonus 2,996 0.758 0.506 1.022 0 11.79
Total Compensation 2,996 3.980 2.413 6.786 0.0032 202.2
Notes: All dollar gures are in millions. Ueva, and Uearn are residuals from regressing EVA and
earnings, respecitively, on last year's value, all scaled by market value of equity. Abnormal returns are
computed as raw returns less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 Index.
21Table 2.1: Simple Correlations Between Compensation,
Performance Measures and Returns















D earn 0.346 0.0918 1
DE V A 0.276 0.0841 0.625 1
Raw Stock
Return
0.303 0.164 0.197 0.147 1
Abnormal
Stock Return
0.342 0.176 0.252 0.155 0.897 1
Notes: Percentage changes in various measures of compensation and performance, prexed by \D".
2,087 observations remain after dropping all rms with only one observation per executive. Changes in
EVA and Earnings are scaled by lagged market value of equity rather than their own lagged levels.
Table 2.2: Simple Correlations Between Weighting Schemes and
Firm Characteristics
γ γ




γVa r 0.202 0.122 1
γVa r L 0.173 0.166 0.789 1
MV of Equity 0.024 -0.010 0.048 0.038 1
Assets 0.021 0.046 0.026 0.012 0.496 1
Leverage 0.010 0.054 -0.020 -0.024 0.033 0.378 1
Tobin's q 0.042 0.023 0.132 0.137 0.294 -0.170 -0.454 1
Notes: Simple correlations with dierent weighting schemes for EVA versus Earnings (γ). γ is
the optimal wieght computed with innovations from 1986-1997, γ
L is the optimal weight computed with
innovations from 1978-1997, γVa r is the naive volatility-based weight equal to
Va r(uearn)
Va r (ueanr)+Va r (ueva) using
innovations from 1987-1997, γVa r Lis identical except that it uses innovations from 1978-1997. Leverage is
the average ratio of long-term debt to total book assets averaged from 1986-1997 and Tobin's q is the ratio
of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity to total book assets, also averaged over 1986-1997.
549 observations (one per rm).
22Table 3: Determinants of Log Total Compensation for Firms that
Theoretically Should and Should Not Use EVA
Explanatory variable Full-sample Firms with γ =0 Firms with γ > 0
Constant 2.234 2.222 2.256
(10.33) (8.17) (6.77)
Lagged Ln(Total Comp) 0.723 0.723 0.722
(25.92) (20.39) (17.09)
Uearn 0.562 1.124 -0.973
(1.68) (2.56) (0.190)
Ueva 0.867 -0.455 0.849
(0.261) (1.09) (1.82)
Raw Return 0.365 0.412 0.290
(5.14) (4.24) (3.13)
Observations 2,096 1,185 911
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.475 0.499
Notes: t-statistics based on robust standard errors allowing for heteroskedasticity and correlated errors
within 3-digit SIC codes.
23Table 4: The Eect of our Optimal Weights on the use of EVA and














Constant 2.267 2.236 2.269 ???
(10.52) (10.30) (10.68) (??)
Lagged Ln (Tot. Comp) 0.727 0.723 0.727 0.723
(25.95) (25.81) (26.19) (25.93)
Uearn 1.763 0.984 0.895 -0.580
(4.64) (2.54) (0.710) (0.045)
Ueva -0.385 -0.280 0.618 0.742
(0.967) (0.732) (0.424) (0.528)






(Ueva)*γVa r -1.163 -1.404
(0.359) (0.449)
(Uearn)*γVa r 0.581 0.366
(0.246) (0.510)
R2 (pseudo-R2 for logit) 0.476 0.487 0.474 0.485
Notes: Sample is 540 rms, weighted by the square root of the number of observations for each rm.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. For the logit analysis we allow errors to be correlated within 4-digit
industries but not across industries. * indicates dierent from zero at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%.
24Table 5: Naive Regressions Using First Dierences in Performance









Constant 0.411 0.413 0.404
(6.37) (6.45) (6.23)
D earn 1.311 1.588 2.559
(5.82) (5.97) (3.03)
De v a 0.452 0.390 0.279
(2.41) (1.75) (0.348)






(D eva)*γVa r 0.183
(0.101)
(D earn)*γVa r -2.414
(1.70)
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.175 0.175
25